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Abstract. This paper explores New Zealand’s early monetary history, examining its 
colonization and the events leading up to the establishment of the Colonial Bank of Issue, 
an early currency board. It describes the operations of the bank during its six-year stint as 
the colony’s sole note issuer. An accompanying spreadsheet workbook contains the 
statistics of the Colonial Bank of Issue. 
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1. Introduction 
ew Zealand conducted its monetary policy through an institution called the 
Colonial Bank of Issue from 1850 to 1856. Although the bank resembles 
nothing close to New Zealand’s current monetary system, it marks a unique 
time during New Zealand’s early struggles as a British colony. This paper 
summarizes the evolution of the financial system during the colonization of New 
Zealand, including the colony’s failed attempts at issuing paper money prior to the 
Bank of Issue. The bank was first proposed in 1847 during a desperate period when 
the colony had no real local note currency, only government debentures and 
foreign notes. The Colonial Bank of Issue opened its doors three years later in 1850 
and began issuing its own notes in currency equal to the British pound. The six 
years of the bank’s operations were plagued by low public confidence and poor 
management. However, the institution was the colony’s first attempt at a national, 
government-issued currency and it proved to be an important part of New 
Zealand’s history.  
Following the summary of the Colonial Bank of Issue’s history, the paper 
examines the statistics of the bank to document the bank’s operations as well as its 
steady decline. The data come from government gazettes as well as from various 
New Zealand newspapers and parliamentary documents in the Papers Past Archive, 
a project of the National Library of New Zealand.  
 
2. Colonization of New Zealand  
The first recorded European to discover the archipelago known today as New 
Zealand was Abel Tasman on December 13, 1642. The Dutch explorer was in 
search of a southern continent in the hope of expanding trade prospects, but instead 
had an unpleasant interaction with the local people and quickly sailed away before 
even setting foot on land. The first inhabitants of New Zealand, the Māori, are 
believed to have migrated to the islands hundreds of years prior to the Europeans 
from present-day Hawaii (Swainson, 1859: 3-4). It wasn’t until over 100 years after 
Tasman that Englishman James Cook landed on the shores of New Zealand on 
October 8, 1769 and became the first recorded European to set foot on the islands. 
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The navigator had friendlier interactions with the locals and he, with his crew, was 
successful in mapping the country as well as cataloging plant and animal species 
(Wilson, 2005). From then on, the islands were on Britain’s map.  
Except for Christian missionaries and whalers, the land brought to light by 
James Cook was left relatively untouched by Europeans until 1839. British 
colonization was motivated by fear that if the British did not start inhabiting New 
Zealand, the French would soon get their foot in the door and claim the islands for 
themselves. In London, a joint stock company was formed, comprised of influential 
persons of all trades, with the purpose of colonizing New Zealand. The New 
Zealand Company purchased land from Māori on the southern point of the North 
Island, without regard to location or natural resources (Swainson, 1859: 74-79).  
The creation of the New Zealand Company as well as their initial colonization 
of the islands prompted the British government to formally establish a colony in 
New Zealand. William Hobson, a British Navy captain and colonial official, was 
given the duty of securing a treaty with the Māori, formalizing British sovereignty 
over the land. Formal British colonization was neither a simple nor a popular 
undertaking. Negotiating with the zealous and occasionally violent Māori proved to 
be a difficult task and gaining public approval for British rule over European 
settlers was another challenge, as many had emigrated to escape formal European 
government (Swainson, 1859: 79-81). 
Hobson gathered Māori chiefs at Waitangi in an attempt to negotiate British 
suzerainty over of the islands. After heated discussion, a deal was reached between 
Hobson and many influential chiefs where sovereignty of New Zealand was given 
to the British monarch as long as Māori lands and customs were preserved. Shortly 
after the Treaty of Waitangi, signed on February 6, 1840, Captain Hobson claimed 
both the North Island and South Island to be under the British rule (Swainson, 
1859: 81-83). 
 
3. Before banks 
The first bankin New Zealand opened in 1840. Before banks started conducting 
business there were other ways of exchanging commodities. Prior to the arrival of 
Europeans, Māori tribes would conduct trade with whalers who frequented the 
waters off of northern New Zealand. As trade increased, merchants would leave 
representatives to reside in small settlements in New Zealand that served as outlets 
for exchange. As a result, coin from New South Wales, America, and Spain was 
introduced into the land, although most trade occurred through bartering and 
exchange of goods. Tobacco, guns, ammunition, and rum became popular goods of 
exchange between the two groups. Not only was this a way for Europeans to trade 
with Māoris, but it was also a common way for Europeans to exchange goods with 
each other before the establishment of banks, or if a bank was not located nearby 
(Bedford, 1916: 19-28).  
Along with barter and trade, certain notes were used as currency prior to the 
advent of banking in the colony. Some prominent whalers paid their crew in 
promissory notes instead of goods. The notes were widely accepted among New 
Zealand store owners. Crews would use the notes in New Zealand to buy goods 
and the notes circulated across the land. At the end of the whaling season, the 
merchants who issued the notes would send ships packed with goods to New 
Zealand. The bearers of whaler notes in New Zealand would then purchase goods 
from the merchant ships, using them as a sort of currency in exchange for 
commodities. Not only merchants but also some well-known storekeepers issued 
notes of their own. In the New Zealand province of Otago, for instance, it was 
common for store owners to issue their own notes, since Otago, in the far south, 
was the last province to see a bank open. The economy of early New Zealand 
functioned entirely off of promissory notes and trade, with almost no use of 
metallic coin prior to the opening of the colony’s first bank in 1840 (Bedford 1916: 
24-28).  
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4. The Union Bank of Australia 
The Union Bank of Australia first opened its doors on March 28, 1840 in Port 
Nicholson, as Wellington was then called. The bank was a London-based 
organization created to facilitate trade with Britain as well as local enterprise. The 
New Zealand Company, located at Port Nicholson, funded the bank as well as the 
Colony’s first newspaper, The New Zealand Gazette. The first issue of the paper, 
published on September 6, 1839 featured a story on the Union Bank: ‚Bills on 
Sydney at 30 days sight will be issued at this office to the settlers… enabling the 
colonists to transmit their funds without deduction.‛ The opening of New 
Zealand’s first bank marked the beginning of notes being issued by a well-
capitalized financial institution in the colony. The directors of the New Zealand 
branch of the Union Bank were George Samuel Evans, Edward Betts Hooper, and 
George Hunter, who all were or would become prominent in New Zealand’s 
colonial history. The deposits in the bank by 1841 were £9,381, while the debts due 
to the bank amounted to £14,928 (Bedford, 1916: 36-39). (The currency unit was 
the pound, equal to the British pound and not really distinct from it in law, as if 
New Zealand were simply a remote English county.) 
In early 1848, the Union Bank opened a branch in Auckland (Bedford, 1915: 
50). The first directors of the Auckland branch were John Campbell and J. J. 
Greenwood (‚The Union Bank of Australia‛ n.d.). During the 1840s, Australia 
faced an economic depression. At a meeting in London, Union Bank officials 
described the cause of the depression: ‚prosperity had evidently induced an 
extension of speculative transactions and of commercial credit, which left the 
colonial community exposed to injurious operation of a reaction evidently hastened 
and increased by the effects of a deficient harvest‛ (Bedford 1916: 51). Although 
New Zealand did not suffer through a similar depression, the Union Bank 
shrankoperations at the Port Nicholson and Auckland branches. The New Zealand 
Spectator published a report from the annual meeting of proprietors of the bank on 
January 16, 1847: ‚It has been stated in a previous report that the branches in New 
Zealand have been almost reduced to small exchange agencies. They have, 
therefore, yielded scarcely any profits during the past year‛ (‚Union Bank of 
Australia‛ 1847). The business of the bank’s New Zealand branches wasso limited 
that the branches published no reports or statements regarding operations from 
June 1842 until 1857 (Bedford, 1916: 53). 
 
5. The New Zealand banking company 
Around the same time as the Union Bank opened at Port Nicholson, another 
bank in New Zealand was beginning to be formed. On May 2, 1840, The New 
Zealand Gazette published an article about a local bank set to open in Kororareka, 
a town located in the Bay of Islands. After a public meeting, it was clear that the 
need for a banking institution was strong. The New Zealand Banking Company 
was formed shortly after with a capital of £50,000 broken up into 5000 shares, with 
2000 shares set aside for potential investors living in Australia. Henry Thompson, 
an employee of the bank, was sent to Australia to find investors for the bank. In 
New South Wales, hewas met with considerable demand for the shares. On 
September 1, 1840, the New Zealand Banking Company was launched at 
Kororareka (present-day Russell). The town, about 240 km north of Auckland, was 
the first permanent European settlement in New Zealand, and at the time was the 
capital of the colony. Upon opening, the capital and shares of the bank were 
increased to £100,000 and 10,000 respectively, with residents of New South Wales 
holding the most shares. The bank named James Clendon, Gilbert Mair, William 
Mayhew, Philo Perry, Daniel Pollen, John Scott, Henry Thompson, and Edward 
Williams as directors (Bedford, 1916:40-43).  
The opening of the bank was praised by local newspapers, although some feared 
the directors of the bank would be easily manipulated by the government. The 
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duties of the bank were simple: offer the colony a paper currency, lend to 
businesses to improve the well-being of the colony, and allow settlers to store 
money in its vaults. Promissory notes were commonly circulated all the way to 
Auckland due to that town’s lack of a bank. After the seat of government was 
moved from Kororareka to Auckland, however, the New Zealand Banking 
Company opened a small branch in the new capital on August 20, 1841. A petition 
for the bank to be moved solely to Auckland was discussed but ultimately was not 
approved since a majority of shareholders in the company lived in Kororareka and 
Sydney. As Auckland grew and developed into New Zealand’s largest city, the 
New Zealand Banking Company chose to keep its focus on the declining town of 
Kororareka, ultimately contributing to its failure (Bedford, 1916: 43-50).  
Between the Union Bank Branch and the New Zealand Banking Company, the 
former proved to be the superior institution. Although the New Zealand Banking 
Company for a time had greater local business, that was only due to its location in 
the populous town of Kororareka. The Union Bank was far more established, with 
large branches in Australia and capital of £500,000. Compared to the Union Bank, 
the New Zealand Banking Company had a customer base with much less 
confidence in the establishment. The Union Bank’s business soon grew larger than 
the New Zealand Banking Company’s. After the New Zealand Banking 
Company’s choice to stay headquartered in Kororareka, the institution began a 
steady decline. Local newspapers reported that the bank ceased paying interest on 
current accounts and refused to service customers. Soon it was heard that its notes 
had been dishonored (gone unpaid) in New South Wales. Newspapers soon advised 
customers to take their money out of the New Zealand Banking Company. The 
banking company was plagued by the Australian depression, poor management, 
and low levels of capital. The final blow to the New Zealand Banking Company 
occurred in 1845, when a Māori attack destroyedKororareka, forcing the dying 
institution to cease operations (Bedford, 1916: 46-50).  
 
5. Government debentures  
New Zealand’s early years as a British colony werefinancially as well as 
politically turbulent. There were multiple issuers of currency and merchants’ IOUs 
that circulated like currency, but even the two largest issuers, the Union Bank of 
Australia and the New Zealand Banking Company, proved inadequate. The latter 
ultimately failed, while the former suffered from an economic depression that was 
afflicting Australia. In 1843, the colony was in desperate need of a reliable 
currency and the newly appointed Governor Robert Fitz Roy sought to accomplish 
just that. FitzRoy took office with the colonial government £15,000 in debt from 
Captain Hobson’s term. After a loan from Sydney came through, FitzRoy issued 
debentures to raise government funds to settle debts. The debentures acted as a debt 
instrument that allowed FitzRoy, to raise money by printing promissory notes to 
lenders. After the debentures caused a run on the New Zealand Banking Company, 
FitzRoy met with the Legislative Council and officially declared the debentures 
legal tender officially on May 16, 1844 with an ordinance. The Council approved 
£15,000 worth of debentures to be issued with 5 percent interest per year secured 
from a recently approved £15,000 loan from Sydney (‚Debentures‛ 1844). The 
settlers were in such dire need of a currency that the majority accepted the 
government debentures at face value, although the notes were speculative at best 
(Bedford, 1916: 58-65). The debentures seemed to work perfectly; the government 
needed money, and the colonists were desperate for a currency.  
The British government thought differently, however. Under British imperial 
practice, colonies were not supposed to make significant changes in currency 
policy without imperial approval. The Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, 
Lord Stanley, wrote to Governor FitzRoy regarding the debentures: ‚measures 
should be taken at the earliest possible period for the redemption of the notes which 
you have issued the continued circulation of which renders hopeless any attempt to 
provide a sound circulating medium for the colony‛ (Bedford, 1916: 71). FitzRoy 
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disregarded Stanley’s imperativeremarks and continued issuing debentures. For a 
while, the Union Bank refused to accept the debentures as legal currency. FitzRoy 
found himself in a difficult position: his debenture policy, which was approved by 
his Legislative Council, suffered from oppositionby Britain. FitzRoy had already 
issued three times the number of debentures stated in his ordinance, with total 
debentures equaling £45,000.Once news got out of the over-issuance of debentures, 
his attempt at issuing a ‚currency‛ was officially a failure. The debentures were 
being exchanged at 20 percent below their face value. The colonists were furious 
and began a petition to remove FitzRoy from Office (Bedford, 1916: 70-76).The 
colonists were left with an irredeemable currency that was depreciating. Due to 
these shortcomings, Governor FitzRoy was replaced with Governor George Grey 
on November 18, 1845 (Bedford, 1916: 82-84).Grey was the governor of South 
Australia before being sent to New Zealand. The British government sent Grey 
with £15,000 to redeem the debentures issued by FitzRoy. Unfortunately, £45,000 
worth of debentures needed to be redeemed. Grey redeemed one-fourth of the 
debentures in specie and exchanged the rest for irredeemable debentures (Matthews 
2003: 43). From the start of his first term as Governor of New Zealand, Grey 
fought an uphill battle. After the failure of the New Zealand Company, the 
suspension of activities of the Union Bank of Australia, and Governor FitzRoy’s 
failed debenture program, Grey and the colonists of New Zealand were in 
desperate need of a reliable monetary system.  
 
6. Fundamentals of the colonial bank of issue  
The New Zealand government’s three previous failures at administering or 
encouraging an adequate form of monetary exchange prompted the British to 
advise the colony’s next course of action. The new Secretary of State for War and 
the Colonies, Lord Grey (Henry George Grey, later Earl Grey, and no relation to 
George Grey), suggested the establishment of a government bank of issue early in 
1847. After New Zealand’s latest blunder (the debenture note crisis) the secretary 
wanted a stable monetary medium for the colony. Following the Crown’s 
suggestions, Governor Grey signed the Paper Currency Ordinance into New 
Zealand law on October 16, 1847.The ordinance read, ‚for the purpose of 
supplying the Colony of New Zealand with a paper currency, there shall be 
established therein by the Government thereof a Bank of Issue, to be called the 
‘Colonial Bank of Issue’‛ (‚Paper Currency‛ 1847: 1).1 The ordinance prohibited 
the issuing of notes by any private institution or individual other than the Union 
Bank. The bank was allowed to continue issuing its own notes; however, the 
number of notes issued was to be set by the governor. The ordinance stated that at 
an undetermined date the Union Bank would be forced to cease the issuance of its 
notes. This clause allowed a transition period for the Union Bank and the colony to 
move to the use of notes from the Colonial Bank of Issue (‚Paper Currency‛ 1847: 
1-5). The Paper Currency Ordinance was careful to mention that it would not be 
put into law until approved bythe Imperial government, in order to avoid a 
controversy similar to that accompanying Governor FitzRoy’s issuance of 
debentures. Although the ordinance was passed in 1847, the Colonial Bank of 
Issue, which was the direct result of the ordinance, did not open its doors until the 
middle of 1850. It should be noted that communication between New Zealand and 
 
1The ultimate ideological origin of the Colonial Bank of Issue has yet to be traced satisfactorily. In the 
1840s, currency policy was a matter of vigorous public debate in Britain. High-level government 
officials were therefore expected to have knowledge of the subject, and some made contributions to 
the debate. Both Greys knew Colonel Robert Torrens, who was involved with the colonization of 
South Australia and was also a noteworthy economist. Torrens was one of the main advocates of the 
so-called Currency Principle, which held that the issuance of paper currency should be regulated so 
that the margin, changes in the supply of paper currency reflected changes in its gold banking. The 
Currency Principle influenced British laws of 1844 and 1845 that imposed a version of it on note 
issue in Britain. It is likely that the British laws influenced the thinking of colonial administrators 
on colonial currency questions, and possible that Torrens and other members of what in retrospect 
came to be called the Currency School had convinced one or both Greys before then. 
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London was only by sailing ship at the time, so it took months to send ordinances 
and to receive imperial approval or disapproval for them. 
The ordinance established two branches of the Colonial Bank of Issue: one 
located at Wellington, and the other at Auckland, the two biggest towns in the 
colony. One manager per branch was appointed by the governor, with no limits to 
each manager’s term. The operations of the bank were restricted to only the issue 
of notes in exchange for cash, and the return of notes in exchange for cash or 
specie (‚Paper Currency‛ 1847: 1-2). Cash referred to the British currency. This 
implies that 1 New Zealand pound was equivalent to 1 pound sterling. With notes 
only being issued in exchange for cash, the bank backed all of its notes with an 
equal amount of specie or cash, again, another requirement of the ordinance to 
prevent a situation similar to FitzRoy’s £45,000 worth of debenturesbeing backed 
by only £15,000. The ordinance stated that no notes issued by the bank wereto be 
for less than £1 and no notes would be issued in pence or shillings. Notes 
exchanged for cash at the bank were required to be charged to the bank’s revenue 
account. Certain amounts of cash received in exchange for notes under the 
ordinance were required to be invested at the discretion of the bank manager and 
Governor. The interest built up from investments was required to be put towards 
paying off expenses of the bank. Managers of the Colonial Bank were required to 
keep records of statistics of the banks, such as notes in circulation and coin held by 
the branch. From their books, managers of the branches were to send weekly 
statements to the Colonial Treasurer, publish monthly statements in the 
Government Gazette, as well as yearly reports on the progress of the Bank of Issue. 
Failure to publish reports as well as exchange notes for cash or cash for notes 
would result in a fine of up to £500 to the manager –an amount that, as we will see, 
exceeded his annual salary (‚Paper Currency‛ 1847: 1-5).  
 
7. Public opinion of the bank of issue 
Both branches, at Wellington and Auckland, opened on June 3, 1850. The 
managers of the Auckland branch and Wellington branch, appointed by the 
governor, were Colonel Hulme and J.G. Thomas respectively (Wellington 
Independent 1850). Since the establishment of the bank (and even before the bank 
officially opened its doors), the institution faced criticism from various news 
sources. New Zealand newspapers questioned the legitimacy of the bank and the 
willingness of the public to accept another government currency after Governor 
FitzRoy’s debenture debacle. One article in particular titled ‚Grey’s Bubble 
Banking Company,‛ published by the AucklandDaily Southern Cross on Friday 
May 31, 1850, just days before the bank’s opening, stated: 
From the universal disapprobation with which the attempt on the part of the 
Government to interfere with the currency and the commercial operations of 
private banking companies was regarded, and so strongly expressed at the time 
when the ‚Currency Ordinance‛ was before the Council… we had hoped that its 
authors and abettors had become fully satisfied of the absurdity of the attempt itself 
(‚Grey’s Bubble Banking Company‛ 1850). 
The article further raised specific grievances such as thelack of need for another 
bank, the Union Bank being satisfactory. The author of the article was a firm 
believer that banking should be left to private institutions. The article questioned 
the public’s acceptance of a new government note and the possibility of the bank 
becoming a profitless waste of colonial funds. It was one of many that offered 
strong criticism of the new institution. 
Opinions on the Colonial Bank of Issue were not all negative however, as an 
article in the Wellington Independent, published on July 20, 1850, proves: ‚A 
Government paper currency is greatly preferable to the currency of private 
individuals… There is considerable profit, as is well known, attending the issue of 
paper money, which is generally agreed should be a national, and not an individual 
gain.‛ The article did express concern, but as long as managers of the banks were 
not corrupted by the ease of printing money (and thus accumulating wealth), then 
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the establishment of a Bank of Issue was warranted. However, there was little faith 
that a greedy government was capable of investing the profits of issuing paper 
money in a way benefiting the colonists (‚Lieutenant Grey‛ 1850). Newspapers of 
the time contained both positive and critical reviews of the Colonial Bank of Issue. 
Most, though, expressed low confidence in the success of the institution as well as 
the New Zealand Government itself.  
 
8. Amendment to the paper currency ordinance 
On July 31, 1851, an amendment to the Paper Currency Ordinance was passed 
by Governor Grey’s government. The amendment repealed some clauses of the 
Paper Currency Ordinance, including a statement leaving the amount of cash in the 
vaults up to the discretion of each branch’s manager and the remainder invested. 
The new act provided a more detailed course of action for dealing with cash 
received from the exchange of bank notes. After the passage of this most recent 
ordinance, one-third of the cash received in exchange for government notes was to 
be held in the banks’ vaults while the other two-thirds were to be invested in public 
securities of Great Britain. The second clause of the amendment ordinance was 
directed towards the Union Bank of Australia’s New Zealand offices. This section 
required the Union Bank to halt its issuing of notes on October 1, 1852, when the 
amendment officially became law. This amendment provided further detail to the 
ordinance of 1847. After over a year in operation, the branches of the Colonial 
Bank of Issue at Auckland and Wellington found that investing in British securities 
proved to be the most reliable and constant source of interest, making the banks 
able to pay off their costs of operation (‚Paper Currency Amendment‛ 1851). 
 
9. Parliamentary report 
Following several condemning statements about the Bank of Issue by members 
of the Auckland Provincial Council, Mr. A. O’Neill and Mr. J. O’Neill, in late 
1853, it came to the attention of the legislature that the bank’s performance should 
be looked into (‚Auckland Provincial Council‛ 1853). A committee was created 
with the purpose of determining ‚as to whether it be desirable to maintain the 
present Bank of Issue, or to make any and what alterations therein, or to substitute 
any and what Government Bank in lieu thereof‛ (‚Report of Select Committee on 
Bank of Issue‛ 1854: 1). The group given this duty, the Select Committee on Bank 
of Issue, reported to the New Zealand House of Representatives on July 28, 1854. 
Their report stated that the Auckland Bank was much worse off than the 
Wellington Bank. In Auckland, transactions for the month of June 1853 totaled 
£6058. Of that number, only £355 of transactions were conducted by the general 
public, while the remaining £5703 of transactions were completed by the Union 
Bank and Colonial Treasurer. Wellington, on the other hand, had a much greater 
public participation and trust in the bank. Notesin circulation at Wellington were 
nearly five times as much as Auckland (‚Report of Select Committee on Bank of 
Issue‛ 1854: 2).  
Overall, the report termed the Bank a failure. The reasons were the lack of 
profits, the experimental nature of the bank being unfit for such a young colony, 
the amount of currency in circulation being limited to the amount of gold in the 
colony, and the low circulation and unexpansive nature of the Colonial Bank’s 
notes. The committee recommended that the Colonial Bank of Issue be closed. The 
report was the first formal statement regarding the bank’s lackluster performance 
and serves as a marker for the beginning of the end of the bank. Following the 
report, the Colonial Bank of Issue began a steady decline until it was ultimately put 
to rest in July of 1856 (‚Report of Select Committee on Bank of Issue‛ 1854: 2-3).  
 
 
10. Operationand statistics 
10. 1. Expenses and revenue  
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Public opinion of the bank was poor when the bank first began conducting 
business, and it remained poor as more and more statistics of the bank’s 
performance became public knowledge. After the bank’s first six months in 
operation, the expenses from the Auckland branch totaled roughly £202, 
consequently the bank brought no profits to the colony. Similar poor results were 
predicted for the Wellington Branch (Wellington Independent 1851). Contributing 
to the criticism was the circumstance that bank managers and the Colonial 
Treasurer failed to publish a report on the annual statistics of the bank by March 1, 
1851 (‚A Governor Wanted‛ 1851). As time progressed, however, the bank did 
producesome positive numbers. Initially the profits of the Bank of Issue werenil, 
but in a report published December 2, 1853, the bank surprised its critics. For 1853, 
the bank brought in £490 of revenue, to produce a profit of £170. The profitswere 
said to have come only from the Wellington Branch, the more successful of the 
two. Despite the profit, criticism continued. A story in the Daily Southern Cross 
dated December 2, 1853 calls the profit a farce, believing that it was the work of 
the Colonial Treasurer exchanging the government’s gold for notes in order for the 
bank to appear profitable (‚Colonial Bank of Issue‛ 1853).  
The Auckland branch of the Colonial Bank of Issue was a millstone. From the 
start, Auckland underperformed and contributed to negative press of the bank. A 
perfect example of this is in a report published by theSelect Committee on Bank of 
Issue on July 28, 1854.  
 
 
Figure 1. Excerpt from a legislative report showing the profits of the two branches of the 
Colonial Bank of Issue(‚Report of Select Committee on Bank of Issue‛ 1854: 3). 
 
From commencement to June 30, 1854, the Auckland branch’s net loss was 
more than three times larger than Wellington’s net gain. The poor performance of 
the Auckland branch erased any profits of the Wellington branch. This is a 
common trend with all statistics of the Bank of Issue. Wellington had a larger 
number of notes in circulation, coin in chest, and investments as well. At the time 
of this publication, in 1854, the population of the Province of Auckland was 11,919 
while the Province of Wellingtonhad only 6,231 European inhabitants (‚Blue Book 
of Statistics‛ 1854).2 Auckland was also the seat of government in New Zealand 
during the Colonial Bank’s existence. Despite Auckland being the center of 
government and supporting a much larger population, the Auckland branch of the 
Colonial Bank of Issue lagged compared to Wellington. The Auckland branch 
suffered from a customer base with low confidence in the bank: ‚The public of 
Auckland never appear to have been favorably disposed towards the circulation of 
this paper, or inclined to use it generally for their trading purposes, preferring the 
gold coinage.‛ (‚Report of Select Committee on Bank of Issue‛ 1854: 2). At this 
point in time, Auckland’s two main customers were the Union Bank and the 
Colonial Treasurer, with almost no transactions from the general public. 
 
 
2 Starting in 1853, New Zealand was divided up into six provinces: New Plymouth, Auckland, and 
Wellington on the North Island, and Nelson, Canterbury, and Otago on the South Island.  
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Figure 2. Yearly income and expenditures for the Auckland branch of the Colonial Bank of 
Issue from 1850 to 1855, from statements in the New Ulster Government Gazette. 
 
In the graph, it is important to see that after the first year of operation, when 
were certain costs of setting up, the only expenses for the Auckland branch 
consisted of the manager’s salary. In the final years of the bank’s existence, 
expenses declined while return on investments increased. I only found data for the 
Auckland branch.  
 
10.2. Salaries 
Employee Salaries 
The salaries of employees of the Colonial Bank of Issue were as follows: 
 Auckland Manager  
1852 Salary: £200  
1855 Salary: £150 
 Wellington Manager  
1852 Salary: £300  
1855 Salary: £150 
 Wellington Bank Clerk   
1851 Salary: £125  
1855 Salary: £170  
Figure 3.Salaries for positions at New Zealand’s Colonial Bank of Issue. Salaries are 
reported for two different years to show the change over the course of the bank’s 
operations. 
Sources: Papers Past: The National Library of New Zealand 1850 – 1856. Web. 7 July 2017. 
[Retrieved from]. 
10.3 Investments 
 
Figure 4. Investments by the Colonial Bank of Issue, primarily in British public securities.   
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Following the Amendment to the Paper Currency Ordinance in 1851, both 
branches of the Colonial Bank of Issue invested two-thirds of their cash on hand in 
British public securities. In the Select Committee on Bank of Issue’s report, it was 
stated that Auckland had invested £1,000 while Wellington had invested £15,000 
in British public funds. Wellington was reported to soon increase its investment to 
£20,000, meaning that the investment by both branches amounted to £21,000 and 
the annual interest earned was close to £600 per year (‚Report of Select Committee 
on Bank of Issue‛ 1854: 2). Late in 1854, the Auckland branch increased its 
investments to £5,000, and to £6,000 in 1855.  
Note Circulation and Coin in Chest: General Remarks 
During the Colonial Bank of Issue’s tenure, the managers of each bank were 
required to publish monthly statistics in the Government Gazette (‚Paper 
Currency‛ 1847). I was able to view some issues of the Government Gazette, and 
New Zealand newspapers often published the statistics. The combination of these 
sources provided data for this paper. The numbers published by the bank on a 
monthly basis included: the number of government notes in circulation (divided up 
into notes £5 and up, and under £5) and the amount of coin held in each bank’s 
vault the same day (divided up into gold and silver). The graphs below show the 
number of notes in circulation and coin held for each branch of the bank, as well as 
for both branches combined.  
Auckland Branch 
The Auckland branch of the Bank of Issue started with £1309 worth of notes in 
circulation and £1309 worth of gold and silver coins in its vault at the end of its 
first month of operation on June 29, 1850. Notes in circulation generally increased 
over time, while the growth of coin in chest was not as strong.  For the first four of 
its six years in business, the bank’s coin closely followed the number of notes in 
circulation. According to the Paper Currency Ordinance of 1847, the bank was only 
allowed to issue notes in exchange for coin or cash and the bank had to surrender 
specie or cash on demand when presented with a bank note. Following this 
principle, it makes sense why the notes and coins moved together until late 1854. It 
should be noted that coin did not exactly equal notes in circulation since paper 
currency was also accepted for the exchange of bank notes, and a majority of the 
bank’s cash was tied up in British investments. In late 1854 a sharp drop in the 
amount of coins in Auckland’s chest occurred. Around that time the Report by the 
Select Committee on Bank of Issue was published, and the bank began its decline. 
The sharp drop in coins could show the increased number of individuals 
exchanging bank notes for specie, causing the amount of coins in the bank’s chest 
to drop. However, around this time, the Auckland branch increased investments by 
£4,000, which would explain the almost identical £4,000 drop in coin from the 
bank’s vault.  
 
 
Figure 5. Notes in circulation and coin in the vault for the Auckland branch of the Colonial 
Bank of Issue from June 29, 1850 to December 31, 1855. 
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Wellington Branch 
The Bank at Wellington had a much higher volume of notes and coin compared 
to the Auckland branch. With Auckland being the larger town, the increased 
volume in Wellington signals higher confidence in the Wellington Bank by its 
customers. Notes in circulation at Wellington ranged from £2,403 after its first 
month of business and peaked at £40,007 on February 23, 1856. Coin in the bank’s 
chest ranged from £907 to its height of £17,566 on January 6, 1855 as well. Both 
statistics showed upward trends in growth, with notes in circulation increasing at a 
higher rate. The Wellington branch had a much smaller proportion of coin to notes 
than Auckland, although it should be noted that Wellington also had much more 
invested in British securities. Both notes in circulation and coin saw a sharp 
increase in early 1854, while coin in the bank slightly decreased shortly after. Both 
Wellington and Auckland’s decreasesin coin started midway through 1854. As 
previously stated, this could have been caused by a large number of settlers 
exchanging notes for specie on demand following the Select Committee on Bank of 
Issue’s report recommending the shutdown of the bank around that time. However, 
it is also likely that the decrease in coin corresponds to an increase in investments 
by the Wellington branch.  
 
 
Figure 6. Notes in circulation and coin in the vault for the Wellington branch of the 
Colonial Bank of Issue from June 29, 1850 to February 23, 1856. 
 
Both Branches Combined 
This graph reflects the two previous graphs of each branch of the Colonial Bank 
of Issue, although statistics for the combined Bank of Issue run a few months 
longer than the monthly reports for the separate branches of the bank. The notes in 
circulation from the Bank of Issue ranged from a low of £3,712 after the bank’s 
first month of operations to £54,085 in May of 1856. The banks coin peaked on 
April 1, 1854 at £22,655, after reaching a low of £1,433 in 1851. Like its two 
branches, the number of notes in circulation increased over time–much different 
from the bank’s coin reserves. Coin in the bank peaked in April 1854 and growth 
of the supply stagnated after asmall drop and recovery in mid-1854. The last year 
of the bank’s existence shows a slump in both notes and coin, as the inevitable 
became clear and notes were promptly exchanged on demand for the bank’s coin 
reserves. The graph on page 16 covers the entire history of the bank from the first 
published statement in June 1850 to its last in July 1856. 
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Figure 7. Notes in circulation and coin in the vault for both the Auckland and Wellington 
branches from June 29, 1850 until the last monthly report on July 12, 1856. 
 
11. Orthodoxy tests for the colonial bank of issue  
The Colonial Bank of Issue was intended to be a currency board. Currency 
boards are anchored to a foreign currency or commodity and have a fixed exchange 
rate with the anchor currency. Notes and coins issued by a currency board are 
convertible on demand into the anchor currency. Typical currency boards have 
foreign reserves equal to or slightly greater than their monetary liabilities. Foreign 
reserves are commonly held in the form of interest-earning securities from the 
anchor country. Currency boards essentially allow a country to operate with 
minimal monetary policy effort, making them a smart choice for developing 
nations, where institutions of governance are often weak (Hanke & Schuler 
1994/2015: 75 – 76).  
Three tests are performed on the Colonial Bank of Issue to determine the 
orthodoxy of the currency board. Data for the tests came from issues of the 
Government Gazette as well as various newspaper articles from the National 
Library of New Zealand’s Papers Past archive. For some months, I inferred items 
on the balance sheet from the fact that assets must equal liabilities and a knowledge 
of the missing items in other months. In particular, the Colonial Bank of Issue only 
held British securities in multiples of £1,000 for all months that have data, and 
holdings only increased, neverdecreased so for the missing months I assumed that 
the holdings remained level or increased in round amounts. It was possible to fill in 
many months, though some still have no data at all. The accompanying spreadsheet 
workbook gives the details. 
 
11.1. Test one: Domestic asset and foreign asset ratios 
The first test for currency board orthodoxy focuses on domestic and foreign 
asset ratios –specifically, the ratio of foreign assets to total assets as well as foreign 
assets to the monetary base. These calculations were also performed on domestic 
assets. The foreign assets of the Colonial Bank of Issue consisted of all coin held 
by the bank as well as investments in British securities. The Colonial Bank of Issue 
held British coins, which are counted as foreign assets since like the British 
securities the bank held, they were issued by a non-New Zealand body.  
Orthodox currency boards typically have net foreign asset (NFA) ratios close to 
100 percent, since foreign reserves are needed for convertibility of home currency 
to anchor currency on demand. The data show that except in 1855, when figures for 
the larger Wellington branch are not available, net foreign assets as a share of total 
assets and of the monetary base were close to 100 percent. The comparatively low 
ratio for the Auckland branch in 1855 is the result of its holdings of notes from the 
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Wellington branch, which are domestic assets but which on a consolidated basis 
would cancel out if Wellington data were available. 
 
 
Figure 8. Net foreign assets as a share of total assets and net foreign assets as a share of the 
monetary base for the combined branches from 1850 – 1856 (except Auckland only for 
1855). 
 
11.2. Test two: Reserve pass-through  
The reserve pass-through test measures the year-over-year change in the 
monetary base divided by the year-over-year change in net foreign reserves. The 
monetary base is notes in circulation in mid-December of each year, the date 
closest to year end for which I was able to find statements for both branches of the 
bank. Net foreign reserves arecoin held bythe bank plus the amount of money 
invested by the Colonial Bank of Issue in British securities.  
Orthodox currency boards in principle should have reserve ratios near 100 
percent, although because of various accounting factors, ratiosbetween 80 to 120 
percentare good enough to show orthodoxy (Hanke, 2008: 280). The ratio for the 
Colonial Bank of Issue is close to 100 percent from 1850 to 1854, when data are 
available for both branches. In 1855, when data are available only for Auckland, 
the ratio drops sharply. Data for July 1856 are again for both branches combined, 
but the ratio is even lower and could be related to the liquidation of the bank. It 
seems reasonable to infer that by this measure the Colonial Bank of Issue was 
orthodox at least for most of its existence and possibly at the end as well. 
 
 
Figure 9. The reserve pass-through ratio is measured by the year over year change in 
monetary base divided by the year over year change in net foreign reserves.The figure for 
1850 is the change from late June, the first data, to mid-December. Figures for 1855 and 
1856 are for Auckland only.  
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11.3. Test three: Changes in monetary base and net foreign assets  
The final test measures the absolute change in both the monetary base and net 
foreign assets by year. Orthodox currency boards have a strong correlation between 
these two measurements, meaning that when monetary base increases or decreases, 
net foreign assets also increase or decrease (Hanke, 2008: 280).  
The data indicate that the absolute changes in net foreign assets and in the 
monetary base moved together very closely, with a correlation coefficient of 0.997. 
The data again indicate that the Colonial Bank of Issue behaved like an orthodox 
currency board. 
 
 
Figure 10. Absolute change in monetary base and net foreign assets for the Auckland 
branch of the Colonial Bank of Issue 1851 - 1855.  Figures for 1850 measure changes from 
late June, the first data, to mid-December. Figures for 1856 measure changes since 1854. 
 
11.4. The winding-up actand bank paper currency act  
After a year of speculation that the New Zealand legislature would close the 
Bank of Issue and several months of decline in its note circulation, on July 7, 1856, 
the New Zealand legislaturepassed an ordinance allowing other institutions to 
begin issuing notes again. The ordinance gave the governor the power to allow any 
banking institution to issue promissory notes redeemable on demand, thus relieving 
the Colonial Bank of Issue of its duties as the sole note issuer in the colony. The 
ordinance specifically stated that ‚the Joint Stock Company or Corporation now 
carrying on the business of a banker in New Zealand under the style of ‘The Union 
Bank of Australia,’ may lawfully issue and circulate within the Colony the 
promissory notes of the Company payable to bearer on demand‛ (‚Bank Paper 
Currency Act‛ 1856). Weeks later, on July 29, 1856, the legislature passed an act 
dissolving the Colonial Bank of Issue. The Winding-Up Act called for the 
redemption of all outstanding notes, taking the notes of the Bank of Issue out of 
circulation. The stocks and investments of the bank were ordered to be liquidated 
and put towards paying off expenses of the bank. Any surplus of funds was 
required to be returned to the government of New Zealand. The act gave the 
Governor power to contact private banking companies to contract with the 
government as well as invest surplus funds from the Bank of Issue in colonial and 
government securities. The Winding-Up Act officially ended the dying Colonial 
Bank of Issue. After over a year of discussion over the fate of the bank, its life was 
ended and accounts settled in one declaration (‚New Zealand Colonial Bank of 
Issue Winding-up‛ 1856). 
 
12. After the colonial bank of issue: Conclusion  
After the demise of the Colonial Bank of Issue by means of the Bank Paper 
Currency Act, private banks took advantage of the open market to set up shop in 
New Zealand. The Union Bank was given the authority to issue notes, joined by the 
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London-based Oriental Bank on August 3, 1857 (Bedford, 1915: 121). Until 1861, 
The Union Bank and Oriental Bank were the only note issuers in the colony. 
However, following the discovery of gold on both the North Island and the South 
Island during the 1860s, many more banks began issuing notes. The Bank of New 
Zealand, the Bank of New South Wales, the National Bank of New Zealand, and 
the Colonial Bank of New Zealand all joined the note issuing club shortly after the 
gold discovery (Matthews, 2003: 43-44).  
The Colonial Bank of Issue was an institution before its time. The idea of a 
monetary authority institution did not gain traction in New Zealand until decades 
later (Matthews 2003: 43). The Colonial Bank of Issue proved to be a poorly timed 
experiment plagued by harsh criticism fromlocal newspapers. Many settlers 
believed that bank was only a means by which the government reaped profits, and 
believed it created little benefit for the common man (Bedford, 1915: 94). In 
reality, the Bank of Issue was a potentially innovative idea, but it was enacted at 
the wrong time. Following the colony’s debenture crisis, colonists had little faith in 
the government which transitioned over to little faith in the bank. In addition to 
this, the banks two offices did little to serve the spread-out population of the colony 
and thus resulted in its short six-year life. The failure of the Bank of Issue had 
nothing to do with the fundamental ideas of the bank, but was caused by a colonist 
population with little confidence in the bank as well as a young, inexperienced 
government. 
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Appendix  
A. An accompanying spreadsheet contains data from the Colonial Bank of Issue 
B. Legislation Mentioned in the Paper 
Treaty of Waitangi       
 February 6, 1840 
Debentures Act of 1844      
 May 18, 1844 
Paper Currency Ordinance       
 October 16, 1847 
Amendment to Paper Currency Ordinance    
 July 31, 1851 
The Bank Paper Currency Act        
July 7, 1856 
The New Zealand Colonial Bank of Issue Winding-up Act   
 July 29, 1856 
 
C. Note from the Colonial Bank of Issue 
 
 
Figure 11. A cancelled one pound note from New Zealand’s Colonial Bank of Issue. The 
note is signed by the bank’s manager and was issued on January 25, 1856. The note can be 
found at the Auckland Museum in Auckland, New Zealand (‚Banknote‛ 1856). 
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